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Abstract 
This paper compares the law and religious jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights across three legal areas: individual religious freedom, institutional religious 
freedom/freedom of the church, and religious symbols/church-state relations. Particular focus is given 
to the manner in which this jurisprudence reveals the underlying structure and meaning of the secular. 
While there remains significant jurisprudential diversity between these two courts and across these 
different legal areas, there is also emerging a shared accounting of religion, secularity, and moral order 
in the late modern the West. These legal systems will increasingly be defined by their similarities 
more than their differences. 
Keywords 
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 1 
I. Law in the Secular Age 
No category is more significant for understanding the structure of law and religion jurisprudence in the 
West than the secular. The most significant law and religion debates of the day concern the meaning of 
the secular, even when the legal questions are not expressly framed in such terms. The fundamental 
issue of modern politics is the secular, and law in turn is intimately engaged in constructing it. Law is 
the scaffolding that gives shape and definition to the secular. It is the site of negotiation over the 
meaning of the secular. The secular, after all, is not an abstract formulation, but a form of moral order 
that finds expression in and through law. Law carves meaning into the secular world and mediates 
experiences of it. But this is not a unidirectional phenomenon, for the conditions of secular order also 
impact the logic of law. Law and the secular exist in a dialectical relationship such that neither law nor 
the secular can be properly understood without considering the ways in which they mutually inform 
each other. 
There is, of course, a vast literature on the secular and post-secular.
1
 Yet, on the whole, little 
attention has been given to the ways that law might illuminate our understanding of the secular. Legal 
scholars have likewise given relatively little attention to how the category of the secular might 
illuminate law and legal theory.
2
 As such, one overarching concern of this paper is to assess how law 
has shaped, and been shaped by, competing conceptions of secular order. It aims to pull the secular 
more fully into conversation with law, and law more fully into conversation with the secular. 
What, though, do we mean by the secular, a complex yet often facilely invoked term? On one level, 
the secular refers simply to that which is profane and not sacred. The secular refers to the space within 
which persons and communities pursue certain limited and temporal goods. From this perspective, the 
secular need not be framed in “radical opposition to the sacred.”3 It is rather, in its historical 
formulation, a jurisdictional category. As Abdullahi An-Na`im observes, “The word ‘secular’ in the 
English language derives from the Latin word saeculum, meaning ‘great span of time’ or, more 
closely, ‘spirit of the sage’….Eventually the term came to be understood as reflecting a distinction 
between secular (temporal) and religious (spiritual) concepts.”4 Indeed, it has been argued that the 
secular, far from being anti-religious, was in important respects a creation of the Christian West.
5
  
These historical and genealogical considerations aside, the secular has come to mean something 
more than a distinction between sacred and profane. Modernity did not invent the secular, but certainly 
vested it with new meaning. Most importantly, the secular is no longer widely understood to be a 
jurisdictional category (i.e. distinguishing the domain of the church from the state) but rather an 
                                                     
1
 The literature on the secular and post-secular traverses a number of disciplines and is, of course, far too expansive and 
diverse to survey here. For a survey of important scholarship, see Slavic  a eli , “Secularism: A Bibliographic Essay,” 
The Hedgehog Review (Fall 2010): 49-55.  
2
 There are some indications that legal scholars are beginning to engage the issue of the secular more directly, though the 
literature remains small and undeveloped. On the whole, there is greater and more sophisticated work on the topic 
emerging from European thinkers. For a survey of recent books in this area see, Zachary R. Calo, Law in the Secular Age, 
Forthcoming, European Political Science. For important books in American scholarship, see Bruce Ledewitz, Church, 
State, and the Crisis in American Secularism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Steven D. Smith, The 
Disenchantment of Secular Discourse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
3
 Robert A. Markus, Christianity and the Secular (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006): 5. The essays 
collected in “Conference: Laïcité in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 49:1 (2010) provide a 
useful survey of important contemporary issues.  
4
 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008): 36 
5
 See, generally, Markus, Christianity and the Secular. See also, Peter J. Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twilight of 
an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2010). 
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ontological one. It represents a way of being and living in the world that is inseparable from western 
identity and self-understanding. As such, we no longer simply inhabit secular political space but rather 
what Charles Taylor calls “A Secular Age.”6 In this respect, the secular has come to refer to deeper 
forms of social meaning and order. Although a sharp departure from older forms of understanding, 
“[t]he secular as most people now understand it is a deeply anti-religious creation.”7 It is this notion of 
the secular that dominates political discourse about the relationship between religion and secularism. 
This understanding of the secular puts religion in a more politically marginalized position. As 
Taylor notes, while “the political organization of all pre-modern societies was in some way connected 
to…faith in, or adherence to God, or some notion of ultimate reality,” politics in modern secular 
societies occurs “without ever encountering God.”8 Secular politics, Taylor seems to be saying, 
reflects an imaginative universe that does not depend on divine authority for its meaning or legitimacy. 
There is no longer any appeal made to external sources of authority as the ground of politics.
9
 Political 
meaning in the secular age has been desacralized at the level ontological meaning.  
Modern secular order has also transformed the shape of law and legal theory. The most obvious 
manifestation of this change has been in church-state relations.
10
 Yet this represents only the most 
surface change. The deeper impact on law has occurred at the level of conceptual jurisprudence. Law 
in modernity is organized as an autonomous expression of human will, governed by its own internal 
rationality and existing fully apart from any participation in a divine economy.
11
 Theological 
categories still exist in the shadows, as Carl Schmitt diagnosed.
12
 Yet religion now resides outside of 
law, tolerated but lacking any role in structuring jurisprudence at the level of conceptual meaning. As 
Remi Brague observes, “in modern societies, law, far from being conceived of in any relation with the 
divine, is quite simply the rule that the human community gives itself, considering only ends that it 
proposes for itself.”13 Religion still informs law, but in more indirect ways. Thus John Witte speaks of 
the ways that religion “gives law its spirit and inspires its adherence to ritual and justice. Law gives 
religion its structure and encourages its devotion to order and organization.”14  
The fundamental matter of law’s ontological severance from religion is settled. Western law exists 
in the aftermath of what Mar  Lilla terms the “Great Separation.”15 Yet, while modernity transformed 
the relationship between law and religion, there remains vigorous debate about the contours of the 
resulting settlement. The place of religion within this secular legal order is still contested, even if the 
boundaries of debate are limited. There is no one secular, no one modernity, no single model for 
relating religion and law. There are rather competing seculars that advance different accounts of the 
                                                     
6
 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) 
7
 Ian T. Benson, “The False Struggle between Believers and Non-believers,” Oasis (December 12, 2010): 22. 
8
 Taylor, A Secular Age, 1. 
9
 Taylor, 2. 
10
 In describing impact of secularization on legal structure, Charles Taylor observes the following: “There are at least two 
models of what constitutes a secular regime. Both involve some kind of separation of church and state. The state can’t be 
officially linked to some religious confession, except in a vestigial and largely symbolic sense, as in England or 
Scandinavia. But secularism requires more than this. The pluralism of society requires that there be some kind of 
neutrality…” Charles Taylor, “The Meaning of Secularism,” The Hedgehog Review (Fall 2010): 1.  
11
 Aquinas’s fourfold division of law – eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law – in the Summa Theologiae is 
emblematic of premodern modes of relating law and theology. 
12
 Schmitt famously proposed that, “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of 
the state.” Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985): 36. 
13
 Rémi Brague, The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007): 1. 
14
  ohn Witte, “The Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 24 
(2012): 327. 
15
 Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God (New York: Knopf, 2007). 
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place of religion within the secular legal order. Indeed, what is most fundamentally at issue in law and 
religion jurisprudence is the meaning of the secular nomos to which modernity gave birth. 
Law and religion debates are often framed as binary disputes between religious and secular values. 
This interpretation is understandable and no doubt reflects the increasingly polarized cultural and 
social dynamics in the West. The movement of people away from tradition religious beliefs and 
institutions pulls debate in one direction. Resurgent religious belief pulls in the other.
16
 Genuine 
conversation appears increasingly difficult, if not impossible.
17
 The stakes seem greater, the debate 
more absolute, common ground ever shrinking. Law is thus left to decide through force of decision 
that which cannot be achieved through culture. As such, law is vested with the burden of determining 
victory in a winner-take-all struggle. 
There is a certain truth to this understanding of what law and religion cases have come to represent, 
but it also misses the full complexity of the present situation. It is misguided to frame law and religion 
jurisprudence in the West on simple binary terms. What is more basically at issue is not the normative 
validity of the secular as such, but rather the form of secular order that will predominate. To describe 
the situation on these terms is not mere linguistic sleight of hand but a way of emphasizing the extent 
to which nearly all partisans accept certain basic premises of legal modernity. It is best to view the 
encounter between religious and secular values within law on dialectical rather than binary terms. The 
jurisprudence consists not of an all or nothing resolution but a slow and oftentimes uneven making and 
remaking of the secular.  
The aim of this paper is to incorporate the category of the secular more fully into the study of law 
and religion, while also moving beyond a binary formulation of the legal debates. It proceeds by 
considering such questions as: How has law been shaped by competing conceptions of the secular? 
What are the implications of this process for the relationship between law and religion? What do 
debates within law and religion reveal about the structure of modern moral order? Are there common 
impulses shaping law and religion jurisprudence in the West? The paper explores these questions by 
surveying the law and religion jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the United 
States Supreme Court. It proceeds by investigating three different areas – individual religious freedom, 
institutional religious freedom, and the symbolic relationship between religion and state. By so doing, 
consideration is given to the varying ways in which the legal treatment of religion shapes conceptions 
of selfhood, society, and the state. While by no means comprehensive, these three areas represent 
central points of engagement between law and religion and collectively provide insights about the 
structure and meaning of secular order. 
In brief, it is argued that these two bodies of jurisprudence reveal the emergence of a shared form 
of secular order across the United States and Europe. Law, moreover, is a main site of negation about 
the terms on which religion might inform the secular. In both systems, law is secularizing and 
generating certain barriers to religion maintaining a stable place within the social order. Yet, law is not 
shaping politics and culture through the imposition of an ideological secularism, but rather by severing 
law from any determined moral meaning. Law, in this respect, has not advanced a form of secular 
order that is fundamentally anti-religious. Partisans who see in law and religion doctrine either a 
creeping secularism or a creeping theocracy miss the larger point. Law’s secularity, as it has ta en 
                                                     
16
 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God is Back: How the Global Revival of Religion is Changing the World 
(New York: Penguin, 2009); Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott & Timothy Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion 
and Global Politics (New Yor : W.W. Norton, 2011). On changing religious dynamics in the United States see, “Nones” 
on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation (Pew Research Center, 2010). 
17
 As Charles Mathewes observes, “These days we seem to have trouble conducting genuine conversations about religious 
belief….Some secularists deem it the height of philosophical sophistication to view those who take a sacred text seriously 
as a in to those who ta e up serpents….A similarly smug  nowingness also infects many believers, seducing them into 
dismissing the challenges skeptics raise just because those challenges are raised by skeptics.” Charles Mathewes, “What’s 
God Got to Do with Religion?” The American Interest (June 17, 2014). 
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shape in law and religion cases, is less an affirmative ideology than an expression of late modernity’s 
exhaustion. Law discloses a secular order defined more by a void than by a determined form of 
meaning. 
A central way in which this void reveals itself is through the legal construction of a liberalism that 
emphasizes the primacy of the individual as the site of moral meaning-making. The Supreme Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights have responded to conflict by creating space in which 
individuals and communities engage in their own forms of moral expression. The secular, in turn, 
becomes a space increasingly defined by the absence of thick moral meaning. In the aggregate, this 
situation has produced a legal arrangement broadly favorable to religious freedom. Yet it is equally 
proving to be a thin foundation on which to build a sustainable order. It liberates religion but also 
creates new barriers.  
The treatment of law and religion issues also reveals the increasingly contested nature of secular 
order in the West. On one hand, the jurisprudence of law and religion participates in a secularization 
process that continues to dislocate religion in various ways. At the same, it is erroneous to interpret 
this process as a straightforward movement in the direction of greater secularization, as if law is 
simply further marginalizing religion. The secular order revealed in this jurisprudence neither rejects 
religion nor depends on it. Religion has been relocated, just as much as it has been than dislocated. 
Echoes of older forms of moral order linger, even as law’s modernity pushes religion more to the 
margins of political meaning. Law’s secularization remains incomplete. 
II. Self: Individual Religious Freedom  
The jurisprudence of individual religious freedom ranges across a vast array of issues. There 
nevertheless are certain general themes and impulses that have emerged in American and European 
case law. This analysis proceeds by exploring how the Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights have addressed four issues that implicate individual religious freedom: proselytism, 
conscientious objection, religious dress, and employment.  
The Constitution of the United States, through its speech and religion clauses, affords broad 
protection to the sort of activities that constitute proselytism. Many of the central issues are well-
settled and uncontroversial. Constitutional law nevertheless “currently supports numerous limitations 
on proselytism.”18 For instance, there are situations in which the government can require a permit prior 
to engaging in religious speech.
19
 Thus, while the state cannot require licensure before a person can go 
door-to-door sharing a religious message, it has some discretion to require registration or licensure 
before participating in such activities as a parade or festival.
20
  
U.S. courts have also granted wide protection to individual religious freedom in the area of 
conscientious objection, which involves the relationship between the individual and the state in its 
starkest form. Recognition of conscientious objector rights has generally been provided through 
statutory provision rather than constitutional principle. A notable feature of cases in this area, 
however, has been the broad interpretation courts have given to the scope of statutory protection. In 
the 1943 case of United States v. Kauten, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
interpreted the phrase “religious training and belief” as encompassing convictions which arise “from a 
sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his 
universe — a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized societies.”21 
                                                     
18
 Howard O. Hunter and Polly J. Price, Brigham Young University Law Review (2001): 538. 
19
 See, for instance, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
20
 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) 
21
 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (1943). 
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This decision was of enduring significance because it held that something less than belief in God could 
constitute a “religious” belief.22 Kauten remains noteworthy for having offered a functional, rather 
than substantive philosophical, definition of religion. Kauten furthered the process by which American 
law defined religion not in terms of the relationship of persons to God or gods but the relationship of 
persons to each other and the ethical ordering of the universe.  
This trend continued in United States v. Seeger (1965) and Welsh v. United States (1970) when the 
Supreme Court severed religion not only from any connection to a supreme being but also any 
necessary source outside the ethical convictions of the self. In Seeger, the Court interpreted the 
statutory definition of “Supreme Being” as referring to “a given belief that is sincere and 
meaningful…in the life of its possessor” in a manner “parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in 
God.”23 Welsh pushed the interpretive logic of Seeger even further, holding that the First Amendment 
protects “moral, ethical or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong” that are held “with the 
strength of traditional religious convictions.” Religion was defined in radically subjective terms that 
encompassed “beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless 
impose…a duty of conscience.”24 Religion thus included the non-religious, so long as the beliefs 
represent an “ultimate concern” in the life on the individual. The connection between religion and 
theism, as well as religion and any metaphysical system, was shattered. Religion collapsed into the 
ethical.  
As with proselytism and conscientious objection, the Supreme Court has broadly protected the 
right to expression through wearing religious dress. One area of dispute concerns the wearing of 
religious garments and symbols in public institutions. With respect to public schools, the Supreme 
Court has held that students retain constitutional rights to religious speech and expression, including 
the right to wear ceremonial religious clothing and clothing containing religious messages.
25
 A lower 
federal court similarly ruled that a school could not prohibit a student from wearing a shirt with a 
Bible verse and critical statements about homosexuality, abortion, and Islam.
26
 On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Morse v. Frederick held that administrators could suppress student 
speech advocating illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event.
27
 While the opinion was narrowly 
tailored to encompass only endorsement of illegal drugs, the underlying principle could be expanded 
to encompass other activities, including religious speech.  
The military has been another site of conflict over religious dress, with the 1986 case Goldman v. 
Weinberger of particular importance. Goldman was an Air Force officer who wore a yarmulke in 
accordance with his Orthodox Jewish faith. He had done so for many years without incident, when a 
commanding officer charged that wearing the yarmulke violated Air Force regulations prohibiting 
headwear indoors. Goldman brought suit claiming a violation of his First Amendment free exercise 
rights. In ruling against Goldman, the Supreme Court stressed that “review of military regulations 
challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar 
laws or regulations designed for civilian society.” While the military context does not render 
constitutional protections “entirely nugatory,” “great deference” must nevertheless be given to the 
judgments of military leadership. In a strongly worded dissent,  ustice Brennan argued that, “The Air 
Force has failed utterly to furnish a credible explanation why an exception to the dress code permitting 
                                                     
22
 This marked a turning away from 19th certain century precedent which tended to conflate religion with Christianity or at 
least monotheism. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 143 U.S. 
457 (1892).  
23
 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965). 
24
 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). 
25
 See, Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
26
 Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
27
 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
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Orthodox Jews to wear neat and conservative yarmulkes while in uniform is likely to interfere with its 
interest in discipline and uniformity.”28 The Court, Brennan claimed, had unnecessarily forced Jewish 
service members to choose between religious obligations and service to country.  
The issue of religious dress is rarely a point of contest in the United States. There has not been 
controversy similar to recent debates in Europe over Islamic headscarves or even Christian symbols. 
In general, the law has granted broad protections to persons to wear religious dress. This reflects, 
among other things, the weight given to individual religious expression. However, it is not implausible 
to read recent cases as also revealing a hesitancy to allow law to become overly deferential to religion 
persons. In several instances, the Court permitted restrictions on religious expression in favor of 
cultivating spaces and institutions denuded of religious particularity. One must however be careful in 
generating broad conclusions from these narrow judgments.  
Lastly, another significant site of contest over individual religious freedom is employment. Much 
of the law concerning religion and employment in the United States is addressed through federal civil 
rights laws, especially Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of religion. Particularly relevant is a 1972 amendment placing an 
affirmative obligation on employers to “reasonably accommodate” the religious practices of an 
employee, so long as doing so does not create an “undue hardship.” Because of this amendment, 
employers can be required to accommodate employees’ religious beliefs in such ways as scheduling 
shifts around the Sabbath, providing a place for prayer, and permitting the wearing of religious dress. 
An area of growing conflict involves workplace tension between religious conscience and non-
discrimination laws.
29
 Cases have arisen, for instance, in connection with state laws requiring 
pharmacists to dispense oral contraceptives, including the morning-after pill, that some deem 
abortifacients. A number of courts, including state courts in Illinois and Wisconsin and a federal court 
in Washington State, have issued rulings that protect the conscience rights of pharmacists from these 
laws.
30
 
A similar conflict was at issue in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock. This case involved a 
wedding photography company, owned by devout Christians, who refused to provide services at the 
ceremony of a same-sex couple. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled the company violated the New 
Mexico Human Rights Act prohibiting public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of 
sexual orientation. Referencing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, the New Mexico court held that applying the Human Rights Act did not violate Elane 
Photography’s First Amendment Free Exercise Rights. Perhaps the most revealing discussion 
appeared in the concurring opinion of Justice Bosson, who argued that the “case provokes reflection 
on what this nation is all about, its promise of fairness, liberty, equality of opportunity, and justice. At 
its heart, this case teaches that at some point in our lives all of us must compromise, if only a little, to 
accommodate the contrasting values of others. A multicultural, pluralistic society, one of our nation’s 
strengths, demands no less.” This statement captures the judge’s belief that the fundamental value at 
issue in such disputes is equality, and that preservation of a certain form of equality is essential to 
advancing pluralistic commitments. The countervailing value of religious freedom is that which must 
here be sacrificed. The meaning and boundaries of religious freedom will be ever more tested in cases 
such as this, which place religion at the crosshairs of the competing values of freedom and equality.  
                                                     
28
 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-510 (1986) 
29
 See, generally, Robert Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
Martha S. Swartz, “"Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses": Personal Beliefs Versus Professional 
Responsibilities,” Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics 6:2 (2006): 269-350. 
30
 Morr-Fitz, Inc. et al., v. Pat Quinn, Governor, et al. 2012 IL App (4th) 110398; Stormans v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 
(2009). 
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As with the Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights has given widespread protection 
to individual religious freedom, though it has arguably done so in a more qualified manner. Individual 
claims of religious freedom have, at times, been given less deference than countervailing claims by the 
state or other entities.  
Proselytism has had an important role in shaping the European Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence. It 
was through anti-proselytism law that the European Court developed its most enduring statement 
about the structure and aims of religious freedom. In the 1993 case Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court 
held that application of a Greek statute prohibiting proselytism violated Article 9. This case involved 
prosecution of a  ehovah’s Witness for proselytizing the wife of a local Orthodox cantor. The Court 
held that Mr. Ko  ina is’s Article 9 rights had been violated because the Gree  court had not 
established that the “conviction was justified in the circumstances of the case by a pressing social 
need.” It is important to note, however, that the European Court found application of the statute to be 
in violation of Article 9, not the statute itself. In fact, the Court seems to have expressly granted states 
the right to limit certain forms of proselytism in noting that “a distinction has to be made between 
bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism.” The Gree  law in question is permissible so long 
as it targets improper proselytism, even though it failed to meet that requirement in this case.  
The most enduring aspect of the European Court’s ruling in Kokkinakis was the manner in which it 
linked proselytism to a larger vision of religious freedom. The following statement has proven 
particularly significant:  
As enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious 
dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won 
over the centuries, depends on it. 
While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, 
freedom to "manifest [one’s] religion". Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the 
existence of religious convictions.
31
 
This claim, repeatedly cited in subsequent decisions, connects religious freedom to the values of 
democratic pluralism. Even more so, Kokkinakis identifies protection of individual religious freedom 
as essential to preserving pluralism. The implications of this connection have been repeatedly tested in 
subsequent religious freedom disputes.
32
  
The European Court was relatively slow to grant protections for conscientious objectors. In an 
early 1965 case, the European Commission found that states did not have an obligation under Article 9 
to recognize claims to conscientious objection.
33
 Subsequent cases revealed an opening in the Court’s 
approach, though it was the 2003 decision in Bayatyan v. Armenia that brought about a significant 
shift in direction.
34
 The Court in Bayatyan held that Armenia had violated the Article 9 rights of a 
 ehovah’s Witness by convicting him of draft evasion, a decision that mar edly expanded the 
protections for religious freedom under the European Convention. The Court concluded “that 
opposition to military service, where it is motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between 
the obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his deeply held religious or other 
beliefs, constitutes a conviction or belief of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance 
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to attract the guarantees of Article 9.”35 With reference to Kokkinakis, the Bayatian decision concludes 
that broadminded respect for minority religious views helps “ensure cohesive and stable pluralism and 
promote religious harmony and tolerance in society.”36  
While Bayatyan expanded Article 9 rights, the European Court’s decisions in the area of religious 
dress have proven more restrictive. This issue, perhaps better than any other, captures important 
differences between U.S. and European case law on individual religious freedom. Most notable are a 
series of decision in which the Court upheld state bans on the wearing of Islamic headscarves.
37
 In 
Dahlab v. Switzerland, the Court held that a primary school teacher’s Article 9(2) right to manifest 
religious beliefs was outweighed by the state’s interest in “protecting the rights and freedoms of others 
and preserving public order and safety.”38 In Sahin v. Turkey, the Court held there was no violation of 
Article 9 when the University of Istanbul prohibited students from wearing headscarves. The Court 
emphasized that religious freedom can be restricted “in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”39 Finally, in Dogru v. France, the Court 
found that an eleven year old Muslim student’s Article 9 rights had not be violated when she was 
disciplined for wearing a headscarf in a physical education class.
40
 Most recently, the Court upheld 
France’s ban on the wearing of the burqa.41  
On one level, these cases are merely prudential exercises in balancing Article 9 with state interests 
pursuant to the margin of appreciation doctrine. Yet these cases must equally be read as a collective 
statement on the status of individual religious freedom in Europe. It is notable that the Court’s 
decisions in this area stand in some ineluctable tension with Kokkinakis’s account of pluralism as a 
necessary feature of democratic society. Against Kokkinakis, the Court’s judgments limited religious 
pluralism in order to preserve the predominance of a secularist public order. Religious freedom is not 
presented as an essential component of the democratic order, but as a potential problem that must be 
contained. 
Decisions rendered in the headscarf cases also stand in tension with aspects of the Court’s recent 
decisions in Eweida vs. United Kingdom. In one decision, the Court held that British Airways’s refusal 
to permit Nadia Eweida, a check-in desk employee, to wear a visible Christian cross interfered with 
her Article 9 rights. The Court noted “that the refusal by British Airways…to allow the applicant to 
remain in her post while visibly wearing a cross amounted to an interference with her right to manifest 
her religion.”42 This case differed from the headscarf cases in that a private company rather than 
government implemented the ban. In reviewing the decisions of British courts, the European Court 
held that “a fair balance was not struc ” between the interests of the company and the employee.43 In 
particular, the Court maintained that too much weight was given to British Airways’s “wish to project 
a certain corporate image.”44 Although a legitimate aim, it must be weighted against Eweida’s Article 
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9 rights. Moreover, “There was no evidence that those who wore other authorized items of religious 
clothing, such as turbans and hibjabs, had any negative impact on British Airways’ brand or image.”45 
In Eweida, the European Court addressed a companion case involving Shirley Chaplain, who had 
also wanted to wear a cross in the course of her employment. Chaplin worked as a nurse in a British 
hospital and had worn a cross on her neck since being confirmed in 1971. The hospital, however, 
maintained a uniform policy that prohibited wearing necklaces in order to reduce risk of injury when 
handling patients. Chaplain’s refusal to follow the policy ultimately resulted in her being transferred to 
a non-nursing position. In distinguishing Chaplain’s situation from Eweida’s, the Court concluded that 
“the reason for as ing [Chaplain] to remove the cross, namely the protection of health and safety on a 
hospital ward, was inherently of a greater magnitude than that which applied [to Eweida].”46 The 
hospital therefore deserved a wider margin of appreciation than British Airways. The Court found no 
Article 9 violation. 
It is difficult to derive a clear principle from these two decisions, which rest on a balancing of 
interests. The headscarf cases are a different matter altogether and are troubling in the way they 
disclose the marginalized position of Islam within the Court’s jurisprudence.47 Whereas an ornamental 
Christian cross has a certain acculturated banality that fails to pose any significant challenge to a 
secular ethos, the headscarf poses an affront to secular order. Pluralistic commitments collapse when 
confronted with strong religion. Can these cases be explained simply by reference to margin of 
appreciation? Perhaps, though it seems the decisions are not about mere deference but rather involve 
the active construction of legal and political meaning.
48
  
Also addressed in Eweida was the interaction of religious conscience with employment policy. The 
particular issue was whether a religious objection to homosexuality should permit an employee certain 
exemptions from work requirements. The first case involved Lillian Ladele, a Christian, who was 
employed by the London Borough of Islington as a registrar of births, deaths and marriages. The Civil 
Partnership Act provided for the registration of same sex civil partnerships in the United Kingdom and 
Islington designated all registrars as civil partnership registrars. In spite of holding religious 
objections, Ladele was ordered to carry out administrative duties involving civil partnerships. Ladele 
“accepted that the aims pursued by the local authority were legitimate, namely to provide access to 
services, irrespective of sexual orientation…. However, she did not consider that the Government had 
demonstrated that there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between these aims and the 
means employed.”49  
The second case involved Gary McFarlane, also a Christian who objected to homosexual activity 
and who worked as a counselor with a private firm offering sex and relationship counselling. The 
employer maintained an Equal Opportunities Policy which provided that no client receive less 
favorable treatment because of sexual orientation. When McFarlane expressed concerns about working 
with same-sex couples, the employer was unwilling to filter clients so as to shield McFarlane. 
McFarlane was eventually dismissed from his employment.  
The Court rejected the complaints of both Ladele and McFarlane. In rather cursory evaluations, the 
Court referenced the margin of appreciation in refusing to find violations of Article 14 and Article 9. 
With respect to Ladele, the Court noted that it “generally allows the national authorities a wide margin 
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of appreciation” in balancing competing rights and that in this instance the local authorities did not 
“[exceed] the margin of appreciation available to them.”50 The Court adopted a similar approach with 
McFarlane in considering “whether a fair balance was struc  between the competing interests at 
sta e.” It concluded that government authorities “benefited from a wide margin of appreciation in 
deciding where to stri e the balance between Mr McFarlane’s right to manifest his religious belief and 
the employer’s interest in securing the rights of others. In all the circumstances, the Court does not 
consider that this margin of appreciation was exceeded in the present case.”51 
While there is nothing facially incoherent about these decisions, the invocation of margin of 
appreciation is done without a discernable pattern.
52
 As in the headscarf cases, deference to margin of 
appreciate seems to depend less on a principled refusal to preempt national authorities than a 
normative judgment about the claims at issue. In the end, the Court was willing to affirm religious 
rights with respect to symbolic matters than determined beliefs and concrete expressive acts.  
It is difficult to render a general conclusion about the status of individual religious freedom in 
American and European law, but there are certain themes and tendencies that might be identified. U.S. 
law remains broadly protective of individual religious freedom. In important respects, these 
protections have expanded in recent years through both First Amendment case law and statutory 
exemptions. Narratives of decline that see religious rights being under assault give inadequate 
attention to the many ways in which American law has preserved and expanded protections for 
individuals. European law also affords broad protections to individual religious freedom, though the 
Europe Court has circumscribed the scope of these rights more than the Supreme Court. The cases 
involving Islamic headscarves and religious expression in the workplace highlight the European 
Court’s willingness to accept limitations on religious freedom that would not be permissible under 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Some points of tension between American and European law reflect different attitudes toward the 
relationship between freedom and equality. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, has argued that U.S. law 
privileges freedom while European law privileges equality.
53
 This is a generalization, to be sure, but 
one with some warrant. However, simply locating the United States and Europe at different points on a 
continuum between freedom and equality neglects the foundational similarities between these 
traditions. Important differences remain but the larger drama at work is one of convergence.  
This convergence is being driven by a shared emphasis on law’s role in advancing self-realization 
through individual expression. As such, law resists strong external moralities, ways of being and 
believing, that impede this end. Law aims not to cultivate shared moral goods, but to advance 
modernity’s creative destruction. In many respects, this process has spurred the expansion of legal 
protections for religion, as law wipes away legal and cultural barriers to religious freedom. At the 
same time, it has undermined the logic of protecting religion-qua-religion and thus placed religious 
freedom on more tenuous foundations. Religion becomes indistinguishable from other forms of 
identity. As law treats religion as a subjective preference, the features of religious belief that require its 
protection become more difficult to articulate and defend.
54
  
Defining religion in this way presents particular problems when religion comes into conflict with 
other forms of moral identity and expression. For instance, on what basis should courts resolve rights 
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conflicts involving religious and sexual freedom, particularly when both are defined as integral to 
authentic self-realization? The most contested legal questions in religious freedom involve such 
conflicts, and the challenges are becoming more severe. For one, the consensus on religious 
accommodation is rapidly dissolving, as are the agreed upon circumstances under which exemptions 
should be established.
55
 This situation reflects, in part, the more marginalized position of religion and 
religious belief in western societies. There has been a loss of shared cultural understanding about 
religion that places upon courts the burden of negotiating complicated conflicts between religious 
freedom and other rights claims. It is here that the limitations of the liberal approach to religious 
freedom are most apparent. Of course, it is important not to overstate the insolubility of these 
emerging tensions. As discussed above, American and European commitments to individual religious 
freedom remains strong and deeply grounded in law. But fault lines are appearing within both legal 
traditions. 
Individual religious freedom also presents a useful perspective from which to assess the culture of 
western secularity. For one, these cases reveal the extent to which the secular lacks determined 
ideological content. Secular law and secular political space, as they have taken shape around 
individual religious freedom, are increasingly defined by the abnegation of meaning. The lack of an 
ideological secularism has opened space for individual religious freedom to flourish. However, this 
condition equally problematizes religious freedom, for it has resulted in a secular order suspicious of 
any claims of a robustly normative sort. This presents a challenge for religious beliefs that embody 
and advance strong forms of public moral meaning and, unsurprisingly, the most significant legal 
challenges for religious freedom now involve situations where religion contravenes other forms of 
liberal self-realization. Points of conflict arise when religious freedom seems to reject, either in 
symbol or substance, a radically decentered form of public morality. The European headscarf cases 
might therefore be understood on such terms, as might conflicts between religion and gay rights or 
contraception. These cases do not involve the judicial advancement of an anti-religious secularism so 
much as judicial resistance to thick forms of meaning that impinge upon the vacant moral terrain of 
the secular order. 
From this vantage point, individual religious freedom stands in an increasingly vulnerable legal 
position, for there is a form of secular order taking shape ill-suited to its long-term flourishing. While 
the secular order of late western modernity does not define itself against religion, it nevertheless subtly 
erodes the foundations of religious freedom. In fact, this secular order embodies a certain contradiction 
with respect to religious freedom. It liberates individuals in a way that advances religious freedom but 
which equally limits the moral space afforded religion. The corrosive effects of these trends will reveal 
themselves further in the coming years.  
III. Society: Institutional Religious Freedom 
No issue has had a more significant role in recent law and religion debate than institutional religious 
liberty. The basic question involved is whether and when religious organizations (including but not 
limited to churches and other communities of worship) should be exempted from neutral laws of 
general applicability in order to preserve religious freedom rights. In addressing this issue, attention 
must be given not simply to religious freedom rights as such (i.e. the text of the First Amendment or 
Article 9) but to the structure of democratic constitutional order. As Richard Garnett observes, the 
ministerial exception raises “fundamental questions about church-state relations and the limits of 
                                                     
55
 See, for instance, Paul Horowitz, “Hobby Lobby is Only the Beginning,” The New York Times (July 1, 2014); Douglas 
Laycoc , “Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars,” University of Illinois Law Review 3 (2014): 839-880.  
Zachary R. Calo 
12 
government authority – questions at the core of the First Amendment’s concerns.”56 The issue 
implicates “power and pluralism” in a more fundamental way than individual religious freedom.57  
Debate in the United States has centered around the 2012 case Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. In this 
case, the Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the “ministerial exception” doctrine. Hosanna-Tabor 
concerned a lawsuit brought by Cheryl Perich, a teacher who had been fired from her teaching position 
at a school operated by a Lutheran church. Perich argued that her dismissal violated state and federal 
disability laws. The church, in turn, argued that such laws did not apply because of the “ministerial” 
nature of Perich’s position. The Supreme Court was thus confronted with two questions. First, should 
U.S. law recognize the doctrine of the ministerial exception? Second, when is a position “ministerial” 
so as to warrant application of the exception? 
With respect to the first matter, the Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the ministerial exception 
doctrine. The Court concluded that “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with 
the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” This conclusion was not only grounded in 
the constitutional text but also broader constitutional structure. As the Court emphasized, “[r]equiring 
a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do 
so….interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.” The church’s right to freely practice its beliefs, 
coupled with the jurisdictional limits of the state to interfere therein, demand some measure of 
autonomy for religious organizations with respect to employment laws. 
The second issue before the Supreme Court concerned the scope of the ministerial exception. It is 
one thing to conclude that employment discrimination law should not, for instance, compel the Roman 
Catholic Church to hire female priests. But who besides clergy should qualify as a “minister” for the 
purposes of the ministerial exception? While the lower court also recognized the ministerial exception, 
it concluded that Perich did not qualify as a minister under the doctrine. In considering Perich’s 
situation, the Supreme Court gave particular attention to the fact that she was as a “called” as opposed 
to “lay” teacher. To become a called teacher, one had to undergo specific academic training and also 
be commissioned by the church congregation to serve in this capacity. In addition, Perich availed 
herself of various federal tax credits available to clergy, thus holding herself out as a matter of law as a 
minister. Finally, Perich taught religion classes and led students in devotional exercises, along with her 
core responsibilities teaching secular subjects. “In light of these considerations,” the Court concluded, 
“Perich was a minister covered by the ministerial exception.”58 The decision thus affirmed the 
underlying principle that religious institutions require some measure of autonomy in order to exercise 
religious freedom. It also offered an account of qualifying ministers that includes persons other than 
clergy. How wide the doctrine’s scope might be remains unsettled, as this decision linked the 
definition of minister tightly to the facts of the case.
59
 Many unanswered questions remain in the wake 
of Hosanna-Tabor.  
In discussing institutional religious freedom, it is important also to mention Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, one of the most intensely divisive cases in recent Supreme Court history. This case involved a 
dispute over the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that employers provide free contraceptive 
coverage to female employees. By a 5-to-4 vote, the Court held that the mandate did not apply to 
closely held for-profit corporations with religiously-based objections to funding contraception. It is 
essential to note that this decision was based on the Court’s interpretation of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and was therefore a statutory rather than First Amendment constitutional judgment. 
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Still, by extending religious freedom protections to a for-profit corporation, the Hobby Lobby decision 
introduced new and complicated issues into the debate over institutional religious freedom. 
Although different in fundamental ways, Hosanna Tabor and Hobby Lobby collectively 
demonstrate the extent to which the most significant issues in religious freedom in America are 
shifting from the individual to the institution. Second, they reveal profound lines of division over the 
purpose and expanse of religious freedom as it relates to other social and political values. The sources 
of this shift are manifold. The expanse of law is ever greater such that no aspect of a religious 
organization seems to escape government regulation.
60
 Moreover, culture war issues such as abortion 
and gay rights show no sign of subsiding and, when coupled with a diminished consensus on 
accommodation, create new points of tension law must address. In this divisive environment, even the 
mar etplace, which Paul Horowitz notes was “once seen as a place to put aside our culture wars,” has 
become the site of conflict.
61
 The debate between freedom and equality, playing out in the nation’s 
churches, schools, hospitals, universities, and businesses, is not likely to abate.  
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a somewhat different approach than the 
Supreme Court. Two decisions are particularly notable – Obst v. Germany and Schüth v. Germany. 
Both cases involved men fired from church employment for engaging in extra-marital affairs. Obst 
had been employed in various high-level positions within the Mormon church, while Schüth had been 
the organist and choirmaster in a Catholic church. The Court acknowledged in both cases a principle 
of religious autonomy, grounded in Article 9 of the Convention as read in light of Article 11 (freedom 
of assembly and association). However, the Court emphasized the need to balance this principle 
against countervailing legal considerations. The competing legal principle in these two cases was the 
Article 8 right to privacy and family life. Lower German courts had upheld the dismissals. The 
European Court in turn upheld the ruling in Obst but overturned it in Schüth. 
The specific rulings in these two cases are less important than the jurisprudential methods 
employed. While the Court affirmed an account of religious autonomy that gave institutions certain 
legal space to operate outside of general employment laws, the scope of this right remains imprecise. 
The right of religious autonomy must, the Court emphasizes, be balanced against a host of other 
considerations and measured in light of particular situational facts. Thus, in assessing Obst’s situation, 
the Court took note of the need for the church to maintain its credibility, the nature of the employee’s 
position, and the injury Obst would suffer if terminated (e.g. he was relatively young and could find 
alternative employment). In the case of Schüth, by contrast, the Court emphasized that an organist and 
choirmaster did not fall within a class of persons who had to be fired for misconduct (unlike a high-
ranking church official like Obst) in order for the religious institution to maintain its integrity. 
Moreover, Schüth did not abandon his rights to privacy and family life by accepting employment with 
the Catholic Church. The Court deemed Schüth’s interests, both personal and professional, to be of 
greater weight in this instance than those of the church. 
On one level, this mode of balancing mirrors what the Supreme Court did in Hosanna-Tabor when 
ma ing judgments about whether Cheryl Perich qualified as a “minister.” Yet the European Court’s 
approach to religious autonomy, at least as exemplified in Obst and Schüth, was more hesitant and 
circumspect. What emerges from these two decisions is less a deep structural or jurisdictional 
principle, so much as a norm to be considered as one factor among many. In both cases, the Court 
examined whether German labor courts properly balanced the applicants' rights under Article 8 against 
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the Convention rights of the Catholic and Mormon churches. By so doing, these decisions do not offer 
substantial guidance for determining when as a general matter the Article 9 right to institutional 
religious freedom will trump other factors.  
The European Court had another opportunity to consider the matter of religious autonomy in 
Siebenhaar v. Germany.
62
 In this case, a kindergarten teacher was fired from her position at a school 
operated by a Protestant parish because she was personally involved in another religious community. 
Siebenhaar’s contract provided that she was to remain loyal to the sponsoring church and not be a 
member of any organization that advocated contrary views. The employer accordingly dismissed 
Siebenhaar upon learning that she had joined the Universal Church/Brotherhood of Humanity. This 
case placed Siebenhaar’s Article 9 right to religious freedom against the church’s right to religious 
autonomy, also grounded in Article 9 read in conjunction with Article 11 (freedom of assembly and 
association). In balancing these competing rights, the European Court upheld a German labor court’s 
finding that Siebenhaar’s Article 9 rights had not been violated. She should have been aware that her 
commitments to the Universal Church were incompatible with her employment in the Protestant 
Church. This case stands in the lineage of Obst and Schüth but differs from them in that it concerns the 
relationship between Article 9 and Article 11 as opposed to Article 9 and Article 8. 
The approach taken in Obst, Schüth, and Siebenhaar made the European Court’s subsequent 
decision in Fernández Martinez v. Spain all the more notable. The Chamber judgment in Fernández 
Martinez mar ed the Court’s embrace of a stronger account of the religious autonomy principle. One 
commentator describes the Fernández Martinez decision as a “ministerial exception to the protection 
of individual human rights.”63 Fernández Martinez, a married Catholic priest, working as a teacher of 
Catholic morals in a public school, was relieved of his duties after a magazine article publicized his 
situation. Like Obst and Schüth, Fernández Martinez challenged his dismissal on grounds that it 
infringed upon his Article 8 right to privacy. As the Court notes, “The main question arising in the 
present case is thus whether the State was required, in the context of its positive obligations under 
Article 8, to uphold the applicant’s right to respect for his private life against the Catholic Church’s 
right to refuse to renew his contract.”64 In addressing this tension, the Court stressed that, “The 
autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society 
and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.” “Moreover,” the Court 
added, “the principle of religious autonomy prevents the State from obliging a religious community to 
admit or exclude an individual or to entrust someone with a particular religious duty.”65 There are 
distinct considerations that must be ta en into account when conflict involves “an employer whose 
ethos [is] based on religion or belief.”66 
In upholding the married priest’s dismissal, the Court focused on the need to defend a space of 
relative autonomy for religious institutions. Unlike Obst and Schüth, which equally balanced religious 
autonomy against other considerations, the Chamber judgment in Fernández Martinez begins with a 
presumption in favor of religious autonomy. The principle must still be balanced against other 
considerations, but the decisions of religious institutions are to given deference because of the place 
such institutions maintain within the constitutional order.  
This relatively strong account of religious autonomy in the Chamber judgment has been qualified 
in important ways. A recent Grand Chamber judgment upheld, by a close 9-8 vote, the Chamber’s 
                                                     
62
 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02 (2011).  
63
 Stijn Smet, “Fernández Martínez v. Spain : Towards a ‘Ministerial Exception’ for Europe?” Strasbourg observers (May 
24, 2012). Available at: http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/05/24/fernandez-martinez-v-spain-towards-a-ministerial-
exception-in-europe/ 
64
 Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, §79 (2012). 
65
 Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, §80 (2012). 
66
 Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, §87 (2012). 
Constructing the Secular: Law and Religion Jurisprudence in Europe and the United States 
15 
ruling but on far more circumscribed terms. The judgment affirms the basic principle of religious 
autonomy. In its most clear statement, the Court states that, “As regards the autonomy of faith 
groups…religious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form of organised structures. 
Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the Convention must be 
interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards associative life against unjustified State 
interference.”67 Yet, the Court quickly follows this affirmation with a statement indicating such 
autonomy is far from absolute. “[A] mere allegation by a religious community that there is an actual or 
potential threat to its autonomy is not sufficient to render any interference with its members’ rights to 
respect for their private or family life.”68 Absent from this analysis is any strong attention to the 
distinctive characteristics of religious organizations. They have rights as associations, but the extent to 
which this differs from the rights of non-religious associations is unclear. Most significantly, the 
Grand Chamber, while affirming a version of religious autonomy, pulls the jurisprudence back into 
line with the balancing approach of Obst, Schüth, and Siebenhaar.  
There is no more important issue in law and religion today than institutional religious autonomy. It 
is particularly important for assessing the nature of secular order because it raises, in a way cases 
involving individual religious freedom do not, fundamental structural and jurisdictional 
considerations. This area of law is the source of growing contestation and will likely prove a more 
important site of law and religion debate than traditional religious freedom and religion-state relations 
questions. The growing involvement of law in matters of moral contest means there will be more 
occasions for law and religious institutions to collide.
69
 The structure of religious freedom in the West 
will be greatly impacted by the outcome of these negotiations.  
On one level, these recent cases are unremarkable. The underlying concept of the ministerial 
exception, for instance, rests on a straightforward recognition of the right religious communities 
maintain over the selection of clergy and religious leaders. It is not within the jurisdiction of the 
secular state to interfere with the internal governance of religious organizations. There are, of course, 
complicated legal questions involving what organizations should qualify for this protection. Should 
the exemption apply to only churches and other communities of worship or extend to religiously-
affiliated organizations such as schools, hospitals, charities, and other non-profits? In addition, what 
employees within an organization are eligible for ministerial exemptions? The law will, over time, 
generate more guidance on these questions, and it might well be that American and European law 
adopt different approaches.  
On the other hand, the increasing centrality of institutions to law and religion debate needs to be 
understood as reflecting deep and changing dynamics within western society. It is particularly worth 
considering why these cases have emerged with such intensity? The cases can, of course, be viewed as 
conflicts arising out of the growing web of state regulations and the loss of cultural consensus. There 
is an important insight here, as discussed above. But this should not be the primary lens through which 
institutional religious freedom is examined. Rather, these legal conflicts reflect a more elemental 
struggle to define moral meaning in late modern society. In particular, religious institutions present a 
determined challenge to the atomizing and detraditionalizing tendencies of the liberal secular order. 
From this perspective, institutional disputes raise different questions from those in the individual 
context, a fact that is lost when the institutional and individual cases are viewed as mere analogues.  
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Religious institutions are the primary bearers of moral tradition and practice. In this respect, they 
are something of an anomaly within a flattened secular order divested of deep moral meaning. Indeed, 
they might be seen to embody a distinctive threat to the secular order. Of course, this need not 
necessarily be the case. Religious institutions might be seen simply as vehicles through which 
individuals pursue the sort of self-fulfillment it was argued the law of individual religious liberty is 
encouraging. Yet, religious institutions are more than aggregations of individuals. They embody 
strong normative accounts of the world, precisely the sort of beliefs that are anathema to the late 
modern secular order. It is unsurprising, in light of this, that institutions have become the central 
battleground in law and religion disputes.  
Given this state of affairs, recent decisions recognizing the principle of religious autonomy are 
somewhat puzzling. One on level, these cases resist the advancement of a morally desiccated 
modernity, for the recognition of institutional religious freedom facilitates the sustentation and 
projection of strong moral identity into secular public life. Religious institutions mitigate against the 
liberal impulse to collapse space between the individual and the state.  
At the same time, significant questions remain about the depth and durability of recent case law in 
this area. While both the Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights have affirmed the 
principle of religious autonomy, significant crosswinds are poised to challenge the logic on which 
these decisions rest. One factor is that that the idea of religious autonomy, as it has found root in 
western law, rests on rather thin foundations. While the principle of religious autonomy necessarily 
entails a jurisdictional understanding of the relationship between the state and religious institutions, 
the deeper structural logic that might animate religious autonomy is lacking. There is no underlying 
account of freedom of the church. There is no ontological account of social spheres that might sustain 
a disaggregated social order.
70
 There is no room for such arguments in the secular social order of 
modernity. Law invokes the category of religious autonomy but without a grounding in deeper 
foundational resources. As with religious symbols, discussed below, this reveals the ways in which 
modernity maintains the shell of inherited concepts while abandoning much of the content.
71
  
Law can still do significant work in this area. However, rooting religious autonomy in a liberal 
logic renders it susceptible to long-term erosion. Protecting religious autonomy so as to grant groups 
space to define their own form of moral order protects the very sorts of communities that are 
problematic within the modern secular order. The law will not long tolerate this contradiction and will 
move to circumscribe the scope of autonomy. The principle will endure but with a radically delimited 
scope.  
IV. State: Religious Symbols 
No issue goes more directly to the meaning of the secular than the state’s support for religious beliefs 
and activities. The issue of religion-state relations encompasses a plethora of issues including religious 
establishment, funding of religious activities (e.g. education or social services), and the subsidization 
of religious organizations through tax policy. Yet, the issue that most frequently invites contestation is 
state sponsorship of religious symbols and speech. It is,  oseph Weiler writes, the “debate that won’t 
go away.”72 Not only won’t the issue go away, but it generates impassioned and often outsized 
attention. In the end, debates about religious symbols are less about symbols than how the political 
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community defines its relationship to religion.
73
 As such, legal debates over religious symbols offer a 
window into the ways law reflects and shapes the idea of the secular.  
Symbolic civil religion has long been part of American political identity. The placement of “In God 
We Trust” on currency, the depiction of religious figures on the frieze of the Supreme Court, and the 
maintenance of congressional chaplains, all testify to the deep connections between religion and 
American democratic life. These sorts of practices have long been subject to critique and legal 
challenge and, as the United States becomes more secular and pluralistic, such challenges will only 
increase.  
If U.S. case law has broadly protected individual and institutional religious freedom, cases 
involving religious symbols have been more varied in their outcomes.
74
 Yet while the case law 
remains variegated, recent cases reveal certain impulses that are shaping the jurisprudence and which 
offer a useful position from which to interrogate legal conceptions of the secular.  
Two of the more important recent religious symbols cases – Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary Co. 
v. ACLU – involved public displays of the Ten Commandments.75 In its 2005 decision in Van Orden v. 
Perry, the Supreme Court held that a Ten Commandments display on the grounds near the Texas State 
Capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause. The decision in Van Orden is interesting because the 
majority opinion begins by proposing that, "Simply having religious content or promoting a message 
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause."
76
 The Court, in 
other words, does not demand the complete absence of religious symbols from secular public space. 
However, determining whether any given religious display is constitutionally permissible demands a 
fact-intensive and context-dependent analysis. In this instance, the Court’s majority gave significant 
attention to the monument’s recognition of “the role of God in our Nation’s heritage.”77 Along similar 
lines, the Court argues that, "Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," an interesting statement 
that is both a historical claim and also, perhaps, a normative proposition. These twin considerations are 
held to justify the monument’s memorialization of the important role religion has maintained in 
American law and culture.  
While history offered some warrant for the religious displays, the Court also assessed the 
monument in light of its character and context. In so doing, the Court gave particular attention to the 
fact that the display is "passive" in nature, by which it seems to mean that its religious meaning is 
muted.
78
 In other words, the monument does not project a narrowly religious message. The Court 
partly bases this claim on the fact that the Ten Commandments monument was only one of many 
historical markers in the display. Given its location in a park with numerous other secular monuments, 
the Court concludes that someone observing the Ten Commandments display would not understand it 
as advancing sectarian theological propositions. 
Following a similar mode of analysis, the Court deemed another Ten Commandments monument 
unconstitutional in McCreary County v. ACLU. At issue in this case was a monument located inside a 
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Kentucky courthouse. In assessing the constitutionality of this display, the majority asked two central 
questions. First, was there a secular purpose in the government’s action? Second, does the monument 
have “the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion”?79 With respect to the first 
question, the Court argued that the monument could not be interpreted as advancing a secular end. The 
Court held that “the insistence of the religious message is hard to avoid.”80 Unlike the monument in 
Van Oden, this monument was such that a “reasonable observer could only think that the Counties 
meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious message.”81 The Court went on to 
conclude that, “When the government initiates an effort to place this statement alone in public view, a 
religious object is unmistakable.”82  
In important respects, the dissenting opinion in McCreary is more interesting for our purposes. 
 ustice Scalia, writing for the dissent, criticizes the majority for “appealing to the demonstrably false 
principle that government cannot favor religion over irreligion.”83 The majority opinion, he argues, 
“suggests that the posting of the Ten Commandments violates the principle that the government cannot 
favor one religion over another. This is indeed a valid principle where public aid or assistance to 
religion is concerned, or where free exercise of religion is at issue, but it necessarily applies in a more 
limited sense to public acknowledgment of the Creator. If religion in the public forum had to be 
entirely nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public form at all.”84 This position not 
only rejects the secular purpose test. It also rejects the idea that the state must be neutral with respect 
to matters of religion. 
Prayer in legislative settings has raised similar issues. The foundational decision in this area came 
in the 1983 case Marsh v. Chambers. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska 
Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with prayer led by a chaplain paid by the state. 
Several aspects of this ruling are worth noting. For one, the Court emphasized that, “The opening of 
sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the 
history and tradition of this country.” While historical practice alone is not dispositive, it “sheds 
light…on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean.” 85 The Court also 
concluded that neither the long tenure of the chaplain nor the fact that he was paid from public funds 
made the practice unconstitutional. Most significantly, the Court emphasized that, “The content of the 
prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has 
been exploited to proselytize or advance one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”86 The holding 
in Marsh thus not only affirmed Nebras a’s practice but granted wide latitude for other governmental 
bodies to engage in legislative prayer. 
The Supreme Court recently returned to this issue in Town of Greece v. Galloway. The town of 
Greece, New York has since 1999 opened town meetings with a prayer delivered by local clergy. The 
overwhelming majority of these prayers were offered by Christian clergy, though the town never acted 
to exclude any particular clergyperson. The facts of this case notably differed from Marsh in that the 
prayer-givers were not paid by the government but were rather volunteers from the community. In this 
respect, counsel for the town emphasized at oral argument that “we believe this case is actually an 
easier case than Marsh because in Marsh, there was a paid chaplain from the same denomination for 
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16 years.”87 On the other hand, the prayers at issue in Marsh were “nonsectarian,” whereas those at 
issue in Town of Greece were explicitly Christian. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the town’s practice of legislative prayer. It is notable 
that all nine justices followed Marsh in accepting that some forms of legislative prayer were 
constitutionally permissible. They differed, however, in their understanding of what form such prayers 
must take. The majority accepted the constitutionality of expressly sectarian prayers, including prayers 
that overwhelming came from one religious tradition, so long as the legislature did not engage in 
proselytism. The dissent, by contrast, argued that legislative prayers must either be framed in 
nonsectarian terms or, alternatively, that the government must actively invite clergy from diverse 
traditions.  
Mention should be given to the Court’s extensive discussion of coercion. In addressing whether the 
town of Greece was coercing citizens,  ustice Kenney wrote for the majority that, “On the record in 
this case the Court is not persuaded that the town of Greece, through the act of offering a brief, 
solemn, and respectful prayer to open its monthly meetings, compelled its citizens to engage in a 
religious observance.”88 The Court added “that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this 
tradition [of public prayer] and understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public proceedings 
and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private citizens, not to afford 
government an opportunity to proselytize or force truant constituents into the pews.”89 This conclusion 
is notable in that the Court does not define theological speech as inherently coercive. Unlike the Ten 
Commandments cases, the Court in Town of Greece did not move to interpret the prayers as acts of 
mere historical or cultural memorialization. They were constitutionally permissible as living and 
theologically particularistic expressions. There are significant differences between legislative prayer 
and religious monuments that allow the Court to make this judgment, but it speaks all the same to the 
deep and ongoing ways in which American public life is tethered to religious forms of meaning. 
No recent case before European Court of Human Rights has occasioned more controversy than 
Lautsi v. Italy, which involved a challenge to the practice of hanging crucifixes in public school 
classrooms. The mother of two schoolchildren claimed this practice violated her Article 9 right to 
religious freedom, in this instance the right to raise her children in accord with her atheistic beliefs. 
More than any other European Court case addressed in this paper, Lautsi acquired significance far 
beyond the technical legal issues at stake. It became a referendum on the fundamental orientation of 
Italian and European culture towards Christianity. The legal debate was thus obscured by the 
accompanying political debate that framed the case as a battle between religion and secularism.
90
  
In the initial opinion, a 2009 Chamber judgment, the Court noted that the state had justified the 
display of crucifixes “by referring to the positive moral message of Christian faith, which transcended 
secular constitutional values, to the role of religion in Italian history and to the deep roots of religion 
in the country’s tradition.”91 The government’s argument, in other words, was that the crucifix was not 
a religious symbol but a symbol that conveyed a “neutral and secular meaning.”92 The Chamber 
rejected this claim and held that the crucifix primarily conveyed a message associated with Roman 
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Catholic Christianity. The Court notes, for instance, that it is “impossible not to notice crucifixes in the 
classroom,” and that students will perceive them to be “an integral part of the school environment.”93 
As such, “the crucifix may easily be interpreted by pupils of all ages as a religious sign, and they will 
feel that they have been brought up in a school environment marked by a particular religion.”94 The 
Court argues that this would be “emotionally disturbing” to some students, especially religious 
minorities.
95
 In light of such considerations, the Court concludes that, “The State has a duty to uphold 
confessional neutrality in public education, where school attendance is compulsory regardless of 
religion, and which must seek to inculcate in pupils the habit of critical thought.”96 
This Chamber judgment was overturned in a 2011 Grand Chamber ruling. The arguments advanced 
in defense of the crucifix are particularly significant. For one, the claim was made that the Chamber 
judgment wrongly conflated neutrality and secularism, framing neutrality as “excluding any relations 
between the State and a particular religion.”97 This is a strong claim that portrays the language of 
neutrality as cover for smuggling a more determined secularism into law. It represents a plausible 
reading of the Chamber’s opinion. As one commentator observed, the Chamber judgment endorsed “a 
strong duty of state neutrality-through-separatism that cannot be found in the Convention text. It is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that the ideal pattern of state-religion relations that the Court appears to 
have in mind is a secular state.”98 Other commentators have similarly pointed out how Chamber 
judgment seems to privilege a strict separation of church and state.
99
  
Another line of argument, similar to that advanced before the Chamber tribunal, was that the cross 
“could be perceived not only as a religious symbol, but also a cultural and identity-linked symbol, the 
symbol of the principles and values which formed the basis of democracy and western civilisation.”100 
Along these lines, the claim was made that the crucifix was a mere “passive symbol” that carried no 
theological significance.
101
 It symbolized common values rooted in history and culture and thus served 
to unite Italians rather than marginalize non-Catholics.
102
 Shorn of religion, the cross became a 
historical marker that should cause no offense to persons or the law. 
While the Grand Chamber decision preserved space for the recognition of Christianity’s role in 
Italian culture, the Court refused to frame its opinion in a way that would permit the deeper integration 
of Christianity into European identity and self-understanding. Indeed, the decision emphasized the 
extent to which the crucifix was drained of any living religious significance.
103
 In so doing, the Court 
sought to avoid rendering a decision that could be interpreted as endorsing either a secularist or 
Christian account of the state. The decision distanced itself from the neutrality-as-secularism approach 
of the Chamber judgment, but redefining religious symbols as cultural artifacts only introduces new 
questions and challenges.  
Cases involving religious symbols have generated enthusiasms unmatched in other areas of law and 
religion. The immense global attention given Lautsi is only the most recent example. Interest in these 
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cases reflects the manner in which they have become a referendum on the state’s religious and moral 
identity. The jurisprudence is accordingly subsumed into a larger struggle to achieve a legal 
imprimatur for either a secularist or religious cultural narrative.  
While tempting to minimize the significance of symbols cases, it is important to recognize the 
deeper issues they raise. As Thomas Berg emphasizes in discussing the Ten Commandments cases, 
“Symbols matter.”104 At issue in religious symbols cases is a foundational struggle to name and 
cultivate public meaning within secular society. Even more, these legal debates offer a window into 
the status of secular meaning and the ongoing negotiation between forms of religious and secular 
identity. However insignificant some of the legal issues appear at first glance, the struggle over 
religious symbols goes to the heart of modernity’s internal tensions and anxieties. 
Viewed from this broader perspective, the debate about religious symbols directly implicates the 
secular and secular meaning. In fact, these cases allow for a more unmediated consideration of the 
secular than other law and religion issues. In particular, symbols raise the question of whether and on 
what terms religious meaning can maintain a role within the secular state. In what sense is it coherent 
to view the secular state through the lens of religious meaning? Are symbols ways of validating 
secular ideals or defensive attempts to resist modernity?
105
 At particular issue is how law and politics 
can even be vested with deep meaning, especially of a religious nature, when the impulse within 
modernity is to shed such meaning?  
The Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights have both permitted certain public 
religious displays, so long as the display is drained of strong and particularistic religious meaning. Of 
particular note is the conceptual and linguistic convergence the two courts have displayed in talking 
about passive versus active symbols. There remain some important differences. The Supreme Court, 
for instance, has exhibited a greater willingness, particularly among some Justices, to affirm religious 
symbols on the grounds that they testify to ongoing linkages between American democratic culture 
and religion. Town of Greece went even further by permitting the almost direct sacralization of 
legislative activity through sectarian prayer. By contrast, the conclusion of Lautsi is that the crucifix, 
while undeniably a religious symbol, is best understood as a cultural icon representing Italian history 
and the Italian state. These differences, however, are ultimately more a matter of tone than substance. 
That there remains greater space within U.S. law for recognizing forms of symbolic religiosity should 
not shroud the ongoing jurisprudential convergence. In both the United States and Europe, there is a 
general openness to religious symbols as long as they do not impose a determined theological 
narrative onto secular law and politics.  
It is plausible to view this approach to religious symbols as a mere via media between secularism 
and religious politics. To some extent this is certainly the case, but there is also a more fundamental 
dynamic at work. The jurisprudence of religious symbols reflects the outworking of a shared logic, 
grounded in the experience of political modernity, that is reconstructing the role of religion within the 
secular order. Two features of this process are particularly worth noting. First, case law has 
increasingly drained religious symbols of religious meaning. Religious symbols are viewed with 
critical suspicion insofar as they contradict modernity’s separation of law and religion. While courts 
have permitted a role for symbols in public life, these symbols are denied any onto-theological 
significance. At the same time, however, the contest over symbols continues unabated, as do efforts to 
define these symbols as a proxy for participation in a transcendent moral order. Echoes of the sacred 
remain, even if in a desiccated and hollow form. Debate about religious symbols reveals the trajectory 
of the secular, as well as its contested realization. The secularization process remains incomplete 
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What is revealed in these cases is the transformation of secular meaning, although not the 
thoroughgoing secularization of politics. Connections between legal and religious meaning have been 
decidedly loosened, but not severed. The question moving forward is whether the current legal 
situation simply reflects a halfway house on the road to a more thoroughgoing secularization or a 
stable and permanent form of secular order. There are certainly pressures to push symbolic religiosity 
further outside of law. The creation of a secular order denuded of deep moral meaning demands as 
much. Yet the outworking of this process is slow. In a way not captured by case law on religious 
freedom, the symbols debate discloses a secular order haunted by anxiety and unable to fully accept a 
foundationless politics. There is a residual yearning to keep the secular in touch with a transcendent 
order. This yearning cannot be satisfied within the boundaries of modernity, resulting in historicized 
religious symbols divested of their meaning and placed in the service of the state. Religious symbols 
become an ossified representation of ideals that cannot be sustained. Yet the tension endures and will 
continue to endure.  
V. Conclusion: Law between Secular and Post-Secular 
There is no single thread uniting American and European law and religion jurisprudence across the 
various issues discussed. There are common themes, to be sure, but also points of tension and conflict. 
There are trends advancing protections for religious freedom, just as there are trends placing religion 
in a more tenuous legal position. In the end, this jurisprudence is defined by internal diversity and, at 
times, a structural incoherence. Yet, while there is no principle that can fully explain the outworking 
of these legal decisions, law and religion jurisprudence collectively provides insights into the structure 
of western secular order. 
For one, law and religion jurisprudence reveals the crisis afflicting western secular culture. There is 
much talk about a crisis of the secular. As applied to law, talk of crisis generally refers to a perceived 
disruption of the western achievement of secular law. For some, it is the failure of secular law to 
contain religion.
106
 For others, it is the failure of religion to narrate legal meaning.
107
 Particulars aside, 
debate about law and the secular crisis tends to unfold on binary terms, emphasizing a conflict 
between religion and secularism over the authentic meaning of the secular order. In this zero sum 
game, every gain for religion comes at the expense of secularism and vice-versa. This is a well-
established framework for exploring the western situation. As Silvio Ferrari observes, “For a long time 
the question of the place and role of religion in the public sphere has been addressed through a binary 
model, contrasting the secular and the religious.”108 There no doubt are ways in which the legal 
situation is properly understood as a “clash of universalisms.”109 But this is far from the main 
challenge.  
The real crisis is not that law has become the site of a pitched battle between secular and religious 
commitments. To the contrary, case law from the United States and Europe reveals a secular order 
stripped of thick normative meaning. Residual cultural forms vest law with the patina of meaning, but 
the doctrine is largely hallow. The secular order is defined more by absence than content, with the 
deeper moral logic that undergirds the western secular order increasingly at its jurisprudential end. In 
this respect, law and religion jurisprudence reveals the shape of the secular after the exhaustion of 
                                                     
106
 Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
107
  oseph H.H. Weiler, “A Christian Europe? Europe and Christianity: rules of commitment,” European View 6 (2007): 
143-150. 
108
 Ferrari, “Law and Religion in a Secular World: A European Perspective,” 356. 
109
 Abdulaziz Sachedina, “The Clash of Universalisms: Religious and Secular in Human Rights,” The Hedgehog Review 9:3 
(2007): 49-62. 
Constructing the Secular: Law and Religion Jurisprudence in Europe and the United States 
23 
western cultural capital. The main concern then is not the shifting axis between secularism and 
religion. It is viability of the secular itself. 
What defines this post-ideological secular order is the legal construction of space within which 
persons and communities (as aggregations of persons) engage in moral meaning-making and self-
fulfillment. The unfolding drama of law and religion in the West most basically concerns the 
jurisprudential advancement and maintenance of this secular regime. Shorn of moral density, law in 
the late modern secular order invites persons to devise their own narratives in a world without a 
story.
110
 The result is a double-edged sword for religion. On one hand, law’s retrenchment from 
advancing determined meaning opens space for religion to flourish, even in cultural contexts where 
religion is marginalized. At the same time, the disembedding of law from a larger normative 
framework leaves religion in a vulnerable position. Religion comes to be defined as preference 
indistinct from any other preference and thus not deserving of special status within law.
111
 
While law and religion jurisprudence reveals the exhaustion of liberalism as a moral tradition, it 
would be inapposite to describe this tradition as void of normative content. The secular order to which 
it gives rise still embodies determined value commitments. In particular, law binds religion within a 
limit principle, and it is at this boundary that the most intense conflicts occur. In a paradoxical way, it 
is the emptying of law’s normative content that generates the boundary. Law creates space for religion 
by divesting itself of dense meaning. Yet, the resultant secular order resists moralities that are strong, 
determined, and threatening to the void.
112
 The secular order that frees religion thus also pushes back 
against religion when it interferes with other moralities and other forms of self-realization.
113
  
The creation of this secular order has been uneven, but there are common dynamics pushing U.S. 
and European jurisprudence in similar directions. There remain differences, to be sure, some of them 
significant. Yet individual cases, and even areas of law, are less significant than the deeper structural 
logic at work within law. Beneath the particular doctrines developed by these two courts is a shared 
accounting of religion, secularity, and moral order in the late modern the West. These legal systems 
will increasingly be defined by their similarities more than their differences.  
Such an interpretation runs contrary to the narrative that often frames comparative studies of 
American and European law and religion. There remain strong strands of exceptionalism that see 
American law as more protective of religion and religious freedom than its European counterpart. For 
instance, an editorial in a British newspaper following Eweida emphasized the fact that American 
commentators thought such a ruling could never happen in the U.S. “with its more robust tradition of 
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respect for religious freedom.”114 Other commentators, remar ing on Islam’s fuller integration into 
American society, have emphasized how “the European Enlightenment sought to protect the state from 
religion, whereas the American settlement aimed to protect religion from the state.”115 These analyses 
shine light on important truths, but neglect deeper similarities between the American and European 
approaches to religion. In both the U.S. and Europe, law reveals the emergence of a common form of 
secular order along with an attendant approach to religion.  
What is the place of religion within this shared secular order? Both American and European law 
advance open and constructive relationships with religion. Both legal systems provide meaningful and, 
in certain respects expanding, protections for religious freedom, both individually and collectively. 
Both legal systems maintain space for religion to shape political and cultural meaning symbolically 
and expressively. Religion and religious freedom are hardly under assault. Secular politics in the West 
has redefined the relationship between law and religion, but has not produced a legal secularism 
defined against religion.  
At the same time, the secular presents real challenges for religion, and these challenges are 
growing. The main problem is that secular order in its regnant form cannot sustain a coherent account 
of the role of religion within law, politics, and culture. This deficit moreover is rooted in the very 
character of liberal modernity. The main challenge is that, as Patric  Deneen argues, “the liberal 
experiment contradicts itself, and a liberal society will inevitably become ‘postliberal.’”116 More than 
simply contradicting itself, liberalism actively undermines itself. The impulse within liberalism is to 
destroy inherited traditions, religion foremost among them, that imbue liberal order with moral 
thickness and that sustain it as an ongoing moral tradition. Space will remain for religion, and it will 
no doubt be given serious regard in law, but it will at the same time become ever more marginal. 
Religion will take the form of a preference and private activity that is limited in how it can carve 
moral meaning into the public.  
This process will take time to fully work itself out. It will be slow and hesitant and uneven. It will 
unfold at a different pace in the United States and Europe. But it is a process well underway, even if 
the full drama is not yet manifest. We are now in medias res, and the legal situation projects a certain 
settledness. But undercurrents of deep change remain at work within law in ways subtle and 
pronounced. Law continues to shape secular order just as secular order continues to shape law. 
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